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SENSITIVE  
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NSC FOR NILSSON, HAYDEN  
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TAGS: [KCFE](#) [OSCE](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#)  
SUBJECT: CFE/JCG: MAY 5 PLENARY - RUSSIA TRIES TO TURN  
TABLES; ALLIES FOCUS ON NON-COMPLIANCE; MOLDOVA IMPLIES 2+1  
NOT EQUAL TO CONSENT

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for Internet.

11. (SBU) Summary. During the U.S.-chaired May 5 JCG Plenary, Russia repeated MFA criticisms of the CFE text of the NATO Summit declaration and presented its Aide-Memoire to all CFE States Parties as Russia's official position on how to restore the viability of the CFE regime on the basis of the U.S.-Russian draft Parallel Actions Package. Russia detailed the necessary elements for striking balance in the package and turned NATO's appeal to Russia around, stressing it is Russia that is urging NATO States Parties to work with Russia as well as all other States Parties to preserve CFE. Belarus expressed support for Russia's ideas while the U.S. stressed the importance of the senior-level bilateral channel for achieving agreement, and noted that the package cannot be disaggregated.

12. (SBU) On compliance issues, ten States Parties (even Iceland) with Turkey in the lead registered concerns with Russia's failure to meet its obligation to provide additional information on Kushchevskaya as of April 1, 2009. Additionally, Portugal, Turkey and the U.S. (supported by eight Allies) raised the issue of Russia's latest inspection refusals and called on Russia to resume its implementation of the CFE Treaty or risk continued degradation of its long-term viability. Russian delegate Ulyanov remarked that Russia hoped to never have to provide flank information again. He claimed that Russia is equally concerned about the state of affairs of CFE and stands ready to engage in all formats on the basis of the package, while alleging the U.S. and NATO remain frozen by "inertia" and would not engage in talks at a reasonable pace.

13. (SBU) On other issues - in an unexpected intervention - the Moldovan Ambassador reiterated for the record that Moldova's position on the 1999 Istanbul commitments had not changed, implying that the 2 1 Joint Declaration of March 18 did not satisfy host nation consent for the presence of foreign forces. Hungary reported on the entry into service of two new look-alike vehicles. At the JCG-T the day prior to the JCG Plenary, Allies debated new formats for the T and the TOI Chair noted that the deadline for submitting

corrections to the Consolidated Matrix would be extended by a week. End Summary.

JCG PLENARY

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"IRRITATED" BY NATO APPEAL ) RUSSIA TOUTS AIDE MEMOIRE  
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14. (SBU) Germany (Schweizer) kicked off the U.S.-chaired (Neighbour) May 5 JCG Plenary by delivering a joint German-French statement on the April 3-4 Strasbourg-Kehl NATO Summit relating the CFE text of the Summit declaration. Noting that the statement was very familiar ) as in verbatim ) and that the Russian MFA had already responded, Russian Chief Arms Control Delegate Ulyanov confined his reaction to two allegations:

-- NATO enlargement was the clear priority for NATO with arms control ranking near the bottom. Ulyanov suggested this was evidenced by the fact that the protocols for Albania and Croatia to join NATO took less than 9 months to approve while NATO CFE States Parties have stated it could take up to 2 years for ratification of the adapted Treaty.

-- The statement's "ironic, sarcastic and irritating" appeal to Russia to cooperate with NATO and others on the basis of the Parallel Actions Package to save CFE was clearly misdirected. Ulyanov claimed that Russia had appealed to NATO two years ago; the lack of response forced Russia to

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"suspend" CFE. He noted talks did not begin until October 2007 (have not been substantive since late November 2007) and have been infrequent. The NATO-Russia Council has been "held up," and JCG work has been "stymied." It appears both sides are talking past each other and NATO remains engaged in a Public Relations exercise.

15. (SBU) Ulyanov verbally presented an Aide-Memoire to the JCG as Russia's official position on how to restore the viability of the CFE regime, noting it would be annexed to the Journal of the Day (JCG/JOUR/693) along with Russia's statement. He remarked it was in part a response to many delegations' voiced wishes for an official reaction, but also intended to serve as a catalyst to current talks. Stressing that Russia still thinks there is time to save the Treaty and it would be "unforgiveable" to let the opportunity pass, Ulyanov stated the basis "could very well be" the U.S.-Russia package as long as there were substantial improvements. (Note: Ulyanov clarified later that this paper was the same one (reftel) that MFA Director Antonov presented to A/S Gottemoeller in Rome on the margins of April 24 START discussions.)

16. (SBU) Ulyanov reiterated many of the standard Russian complaints about "Russian actions for vague NATO promises" and rattled off a list of "musts" to ensure balance in the package (maximum assurances for ratification, provisional application, reduced equipment ceilings for NATO SPs, conditions for accession for new NATO members including Croatia and Albania, and a definition of substantial combat forces.) He then highlighted aspects which he noted were of concern to many delegations and would require progress to move forward:

-- Flanks: First and foremost, the flanks must be abolished for the Russian Federation. There should be "no illusions" - discriminatory territorial subceilings (legal restrictions) must be eliminated for Russia. At the same time, Russia is ready to study reasonable, bilateral CSBMs on a reciprocal basis if any partners feel the need to negotiate such measures. (Note. Ulyanov has repeatedly made clear on the margins that this is not/not a negotiating tactic. The flanks must go. End note.)

-- Regional level: Russia is prepared to consider some measures of transparency with respect to both Moldova and the South Caucasus taking into account the "real" situation in those regions, and providing that the package is truly balanced.

-- Resuming implementation: Russia will resume CFE implementation upon entry into force of A/CFE or its provisional application. Once the package is agreed ) depending on its contents ) Russia would consider some reciprocal, bilateral transparency measures prior to provisional application as a good will gesture.

-- Modalities for future talks: Russia is ready to step up efforts in bilateral talks with representatives from capitals as well as in the day-to-day work of delegations in Vienna, as must he said if we genuinely want progress. Ulyanov called for "democratic principles" to be incorporated into the process by including all CFE States Parties. (He claimed that progress was achieved when U.S.-Russia talks were more intensive adding that this had not been the case since November 29, 2007 in Madrid and noting the package had not changed since December 2007.)

-- Extraordinary Conference ) could serve as mechanism for approving the revised draft package.

-- Lastly, it is Russia that urges the NATO States Parties to work with Russia as well as all other States Parties on the basis of the U.S.-Russia draft package in the interest of preserving the CFE regime.

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¶7. (SBU) Belarus and the U.S. were the only delegations to respond. Belarus (Krayushkin) characterized Russia's ideas as constructive especially regarding ratification of A/CFE, provisional application, and conditions for accession of new NATO members. Krayushkin added that the moratorium was not the cause of the current problem, rather the result, and stressed that the JCG should not be sidelined. He called for the U.S. and Russia to provide regular updates to enable all CFE States Parties to consider important developments.

¶8. (SBU) The U.S. (Silberberg) undertook to report to Washington on a paper that appeared very similar to one Russia had presented bilaterally on April 24 while noting the U.S. position of not disaggregating the package remained the same. He also stressed the importance of the high-level bilateral channel for achieving agreement on the basis of the package (especially in light of MFA Director Antonov's expressed interest to intensify this channel) and took issue with Ulyanov's claim that our recent efforts lacked substance and intensity.

¶9. (SBU) Ulyanov took the floor again to clarify the paper was word-for-word the same; Russia had provided it in advance to its "lead partner." He was pleased the U.S. was open to intensifying bilateral efforts, but still could not comprehend why Vienna did not have a role, one that would entail working out details of the whole package to support higher level talk, and not disaggregating it.

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MOLDOVA IMPLIES 2 1 NOT EQUAL TO HOST NATION CONSENT  
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¶10. (SBU) The Moldovan Ambassador (Postolachi) noted that Moldova has presented its position on issues related to the CFE Treaty on many occasions - including the Third CFE Review Conference and the June 2007 Extraordinary Conference. He reiterated for the record that the well-known Moldovan position "with regard to the package of commitments undertaken at the OSCE Istanbul Summit, including the withdrawal of foreign forces - has not changed." A somewhat

heated Russia-Moldova exchange ensued. Russia sought clarification on what Moldova meant by withdrawal of foreign forces and by the 21 statement issued on March 18 by three "Heads of State." Moldova stressed that withdrawal of foreign forces meant just that and took offense at the implication that Russia did not respect its territorial integrity, reminding Russia that Transnistria is not a republic but a part of Moldova.

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EVEN ICELAND BLASTS RUSSIA FOR NON-COMPLIANCE  
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¶11. (SBU) KUSHCHEVSKAYA DATA: As coordinated by the U.S., Turkey (Begeg) led the charge which included (U.S., Norway, the UK, Romania, Moldova, Bulgaria, France, Georgia, Germany and even Iceland (Bjarnadottin) - to Ulyanov's apparent amusement) to register for the record Russia's failure to provide additional information on Kushchevskaya, as of April 1, 2009. The main message expressed was the importance of transparency and the special importance of the flanks as well as concern with Russia's continued non-compliance which would lead to further degradation of the CFE regime thereby undermining its long-term viability. Turkey (Begeg) was strongest on the flank, clarifying for Russia that he had "no illusions" about the reality of the flank geography recalling the August 2008 "wake up call" of Russia's aggression in Georgia. Begeg was clear: stability in the Caucasus is far more important than the political concerns of one of our Treaty partners.

¶12. (SBU) Ulyanov felt compelled to use the opportunity to comment on flank limitations, recalling for all that the CFE Treaty says nothing on Kushchevskaya. He characterized the quarterly information requirement as part of a

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"discriminatory package" of additional measures for Russia and repeated standard Russian arguments about NATO's continued violation of flank limits as a result of NATO enlargement. He hoped that the Parallel Actions Package would address this issue by achieving a balanced approach and that Russia would never be asked again for such information.

¶13. (SBU) AUGUST 2008 DETOUR: Ulyanov also took issue with Turkey's remarks regarding the events of August 2008 noting it was Russia that had to repel aggression against its peacekeepers as well as civilians in South Ossetia. He drew quite a different conclusion than Begeg: these events proved just how debilitating the flanks are for Russia. Georgia (Giorgadze) immediately countered with its perspective of the conflict. Several rounds of accusations between Russia and Georgia followed ranging from "who started it?" to differing interpretations of how Chechnya applied. In the last round, Ulyanov noted that the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was a reality all needed to face; Georgia countered that that was an "unacceptable" new reality and hoped no other delegation would support that view.

¶14. (SBU) INSPECTION REFUSALS. Portugal (Teixeira), Turkey (Begeg) and the U.S. (Silberberg) each noted Russia's refusal of respective CFE inspection notifications for April, calling for Russia's full compliance and expressing concern with the ongoing impasse over CFE. Also as coordinated by the U.S. del -- Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Romania, Italy, the UK, Belgium, and the Czech Republic spoke in support of the refused parties, echoing concerns with Russia's continued inspection refusals and urging Russia to return to active participation.

¶15. (SBU) Russia broke with its recent practice of not responding to the "slew" of inspection refusal complaints in order to emphasize concern with the current predicament of all. Ulyanov noted the statements reflected genuine concern about the Treaty, a concern Moscow shares. He called upon all States Parties to "cease the inertia" and "heed Russia's

appeal" to cooperate on the basis of the draft package so that inspections could resume as soon as possible.

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HUNGARY NOTIFIES ENTRY INTO SERVICE OF NEW EQUIP  
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¶16. (SBU) Hungary (Haupt) reported on its recent notification (CFE/HU/09/7/F13/O) of the entry into service of two new Armored Personnel Carrier look-alikes. One is a maintenance and recovery vehicle and the other is an NBC reconnaissance vehicle; both are on BTR-80 chassis. Hungary informed all that hard copy photographs had been submitted to the Secretariat and that there would be a demonstration on May 27.

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TWO PLENARIES LIKELY TO BE CANCELED  
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¶17. (SBU) The Chair (Neighbour) noted that there were out-of-town meetings scheduled in late May and early June on important CFE matters and suggested canceling JCG meetings on May 27 and June 9. This proposal will likely be approved at the next JCG meeting as there are no known objections.

¶18. (SBU) Regarding administrative information on the June 10 Berlin seminar, Germany (Schweizer) noted invitations had gone out to all capitals (including CFE States Parties/NATO Allies as well as all who could accede to CFE.) The program of events should be distributed via Note Verbale this week ) delegations will include HOD 3; registration will be available on line; and information will be sent to capitals.

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JCG-T PLUS 4 ) ENGAGES IN ADVANCED MATH  
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¶19. (SBU) The JCG-T plus 4, chaired by Canada (Linteau), met on May 4 for a read out of the April 28 HLTF meeting and to coordinate plans on Allied interventions for the May 5 JCG plenary and discuss intentions of the Russian delegation. The TOI Chair noted that the deadline for corrections to the Consolidated Matrix would be extended by a week.

¶20. (SBU) Additionally, the JCG-T inconclusively considered whether the JCG-T plus 4 in adding Albania and Croatia to the mix should now be a JCG-T plus 6; JCG-T plus 4 plus 2 (those that have expressed readiness to join A/CFE and those who have not); or a Mini-Caucus that covers the full range of issues. The German proposal that the JCG-T align its chairman rotation with the NATO Caucus monthly rotation also fed into the discussion. Most favored this pragmatic approach, but Greece was the most hesitant mainly due to concerns with inconsistencies that could arise if the JCG-T was chaired by a non-CFE State Party. Croatia and Latvia expressed appreciation for being included in discussions, but neither seemed to jump at the opportunity to chair meetings. Allies agreed with a UK proposal to reflect further on the issue and return to the discussion at a subsequent meeting.

¶21. (U) The next JCG Plenary will take place on May 12, under U.S. chairmanship, and will be preceded by the JCG-T on May 11, under Danish chairmanship.  
SCOTT